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Muna B. Ndulo
Until the removal of the Taliban regime by coali-
tion forces in 2001, Afghanistan had experienced
23 years of almost continuous conflict. Under the
arrangements agreed upon at a conference held in
Bonn in 2001,1 Afghanistan is now engaged in a
peace process designed to establish a democratic
government. The Bonn Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements (Bonn Agreement) seeks to “estab-
lish a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic
and fully representative government.”2 One major
advantage for the peace process is that the people of
Afghanistan are tired of the rule of the gun. They
have welcomed international assistance, and would
like to establish a political system that embraces the
principles of democratic governance enshrined in
the Bonn Agreement. However, as the United
Nations has observed, the consequences of civil war
are still apparent in Afghanistan. Strong factional
interests have attempted to entrench themselves in
the wake of the collapse of the Taliban, and the
creation of an environment where the standards of
freedom and fairness enunciated in the Bonn
Agreement prevail is a major challenge.3
In this article, I examine the prospects and chal-
lenges of establishing democracy in Afghanistan. I
do this with the firm belief that a successful peace
process in Afghanistan can make a significant con-
tribution to the fight against terrorism, as well as
the eradication of poverty and inequality in an
important region of the world. This process needs
to be encouraged.
Background to the
Afghanistan Situation
Despite several attempts by Britain to bring the
country under its influence in the nineteenth cen-
tury, Afghanistan has, for the most part, been an
independent state.4 For the last 23 years, however,
Afghanistan has experienced almost uninterrupted
war. The Soviet Union intervened in 1980 and
installed Babrak Kamal as the ruler. This was fol-
lowed by anti-regime resistance by various
mujahedin groups.5 In 1985, the mujahedin
formed an alliance against the Soviet Union in
Pakistan. The alliance, comprised of the United
States, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia,
supplied arms and financial assistance to the
mujahedin. The conflict resulted in the displace-
ment of approximately half the Afghan population,
with many fleeing to neighboring Iran or Pakistan.
In 1988, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and Pakistan signed a peace accord,
and the Soviet Union pulled out its troops. In
1992, the mujahedin triumphed, and the Soviet-
backed Najibullah government fell from power.
This, however, did not result in peace, as vari-
ous rival militias fought each other for control of
Kabul. The mujahedin factions agreed to form a
government with the ethnic Tajik. Burhanuddin
Rabbani was proclaimed president in 1993.
Factional contests continued, and the Pashtun-
dominated Taliban emerged as a major challenge
to the Rabbani government. In 1996, the Taliban
seized control of Kabul. The group introduced a
hard-line version of Islam which banned women
Above: The author
(center) talks with  a
guard (right) at an
Afghanistan army
guard post as part of a
U.N. assistance mission
in Kabul this past year.
Prof. Ndulo’s translator
stands at left.
AFGHANISTAN:
Prospects for Peace and Democratic
Governance and the War on Terrorism
11Fall/Winter 2003
from work, and introduced Islamic punishments
that included stoning to death and amputations.
Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the legiti-
mate government of Afghanistan. At the height of
their power, the Taliban controlled as much as
two-thirds of the country. In 1999, the United
States imposed an air embargo and financial sanc-
tions on the country in order to force Afghanistan
to hand over Osama bin Laden, who was wanted
for trial in connection with the east African bomb-
ings of U.S. embassies. The United Nations
imposed further sanctions6 in 2001 to force the
Taliban to hand over bin Laden after the terrorist
attacks of September 11. In October 2001, the
United States and Britain launched air strikes
against Afghanistan in retaliation for the Taliban’s
refusal to hand over bin Laden, whom they held
responsible for the attacks. In November 2001, the
Northern Alliance, a group of anti-Taliban militias
backed by the United States, seized Kabul and
drove the Taliban out of power. On December 5,
2001, talks brokered by the United Nations led
to the Bonn Agreement, intended to provide
benchmarks for the peace process
pending the re-establishment of
permanent government institu-
tions. Pashtun royalist Hamid
Karzai was sworn in as head of an
interim government and charged
with the responsibility of imple-
menting the Bonn Agreement. In
December 2001, the United Nations Security
Council authorized deployment of the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul
and the surrounding areas.7
Until recently, the mandate covered only Kabul.
After much pressure from the interim government
and from NGOS operating in Afghanistan, the
United Nations agreed in October 2003 to extend
deployment of the ISAF to areas outside of Kabul.8
This was welcome news, as it was seen as the best
way to fill the security gap in the provinces. In
August 2003, NATO took control of security in
Kabul. This was NATO’s first operational commit-
ment outside of Europe. Allied forces led by the
United States continue their military campaign to
find remnants of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in
the southeast. In March 2002, the Security Council
established the United Nations Assistance Mission
to Afghanistan (UNAMA).9 UNAMA’s mandate is
to assist the Interim Government of Afghanistan in
implementing the Bonn Agreement.
Ethnic Groups and Regional Factors
Affecting the Afghanistan Situation
Afghanistan is composed of several ethnic groups.
The main ones are the Pashtuns, in the south of
the country (38%); the Tajiks, in the north (25%);
the Uzbeks, in the west (10%); and the Hazara, in
the center (20%). Additional groups include the
Turkmen, the Kuchis, the Baluchis and the
Aimaks. Each of these ethnic communities is mobi-
lized under the control of warlords. Each warlord
has his contingent of fighters and sources of arms
and funds, including revenues from smuggling,
import duties, and drug trafficking. Warlords have
replaced traditional authorities, and are now well
entrenched in local communities. Alliances and
hostilities between the varying factions are based on
personal loyalties, ethnic identities, or political
beliefs. Political groups often regard as enemies all
members of a particular clan, or all residents of a
locality affiliated with a rival political group. Their
attacks target all members of such groups, whether
or not they are combatants. There are linguistic
and religious differences as well. While 75 percent
of the people are Sunni Muslims, 20 percent are
Shia Muslims. Others follow the Agha Khan.10
Linguistic or religious differences in themselves are
not problematic; they are problematic only when
they are politicized, as they are in Afghanistan.
Each warlord has his contingent of fighters and sources
of arms and funds, including revenues from smuggling,
import duties, and drug trafficking.
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The warlords maintain control of their commu-
nities by a combination of intimidation and
protection. Warlords have guarded their autonomy
while demanding a fair share of central authority’s
jobs and financial resources. The elimination of the
Taliban and the weakness of central government
have created a power vacuum that the warlords
have filled. In failed states, where governments
cannot exercise authority, warlords emerge to fill
the power vacuum, and individuals tend to fall
back on their own ethnic or religious communities
for security. Another complication in Afghanistan
is the influence of outsiders who have attempted to
promote their own interests by manipulating vul-
nerable fellow ethnicities within the country.
Pakistan, for example, tries to counter Pashtun
nationalism by cultivating Islamic militancy among
its Pashtun neighbors through ideological and
military support for the Taliban movement. Paki-
stan assisted the Saudi regime in spreading the
Wahhabi version of fundamentalist Islam. It fi-
nanced and provided instructors for schools that
trained the Taliban cadres. Iran is likewise commit-
ted to protecting Afghanistan’s Shia minorities,
which is the reason for Iran’s hostilities toward the
Taliban during their reign.
The Afghan economy has been shattered by war,
further limiting the government’s ability to govern
effectively. The Central Bank of Afghanistan fore-
casts the 2003 GDP at about $5 billion; with a
population of 22 million, income per capita is a
mere $225. The whole country in August 3003 had
no commercial banks. War has devastated the
infrastructure. An estimated 5 million people are
displaced. Afghanistan also faces severe health
issues. A UNICEF report found that one in four
Afghan children dies before the age of five, most
from hygiene-preventable waterborne illnesses like
diarrhea, acute respiratory problems, malnutrition,
and vaccine-preventable illnesses.11 Since the Af-
ghan government lacks money, the international
community will have to finance its reconstruction.
Thus far, most of the financial pledges made to
Afghanistan have not materialized. Compared to
other post-conflict situations in Bosnia, Kosovo,
East Timor, and Rwanda, Afghanistan receives
much less in aid per capita.12 The warlords were
involved in the Bonn negotiations and are signato-
ries to the Bonn Agreement. Their involvement
has had its own costs in the peace process, as it has
tended to provide them with some legitimacy.
Their hold on power, however, can be changed
once communities have an alternative source of
security.
The Bonn Agreement as the
Foundation of the Peace Process
The Bonn Agreement established the Interim
Government on December 22, 2001 through an
Emergency Loya Jirga (a traditional Afghan tradi-
tional consultative assembly). The Government
was to be a broad-based administration formed to
lead Afghanistan until a fully representative gov-
ernment is elected through free and fair elections
to be held in June 2004. The Interim Government
is charged with drafting a new constitution and
rebuilding the judicial system. The Interim Ad-
ministration is to establish a judicial commission
to rebuild the domestic justice system in accor-
dance with Islamic principles, international
standards, the rule of law and Afghanistan legal
traditions; a Central Bank; an independent civil
service commission; and an independent human
rights commission. All of the talks are to be carried
out with the assistance of the United Nations.
The Bonn Agreement provides that the judicial
power of Afghanistan shall be independent and
An Afghan family’s makeshift living quarters in the foreground
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shall be vested in a Supreme
Court of Afghanistan, and other
such courts as the Interim Gov-
ernment establishes. One of the
weaknesses of the Bonn Agree-
ment is that it focuses on
building state institutions which are typically elite-
based, and does not provide a parallel mechanism
for settling local conflicts and political disputes in
the peace process. Other peace processes have made
the same mistake. The exception was South Africa,
where, parallel to the development of national
institutions, a process known as the peace accord
was established.13 This involved setting up peace
committees in every community in the country. In
these committees, various communities met to
resolve conflict at the community level, and to
work together on development and reconstruction
in their communities. This process sought to com-
bine two of the most important aspects of conflict
resolution. It secured parties’ endorsement of, and
commitment to, important and relevant common
values. These values provided a transcendent refer-
ence point for the settlement of future disputes,
and comprised at least part of the foundation of a
future national political culture in a democratic
state. The culture and habit of democratic self-
governance, regard for human rights and
obligations, cooperative governance, and multi-
cultural tolerance and harmony, all need to be
developed in order to ensure enduring peace in a
post-conflict state.
The Special Representative of the U.N. Secre-
tary General noted, “The furthering of the political
process, together with reconstruction programs, the
improvement in the human rights situation,
counter-narcotics programs, and other aspects of
the Bonn process, all depend to a great extent on
the security situation.” 14 A key element of the
Bonn Agreement is disarmament. The relevant
provision states: “Upon the official transfer of
power, all mujahedin, Afghan armed forces and
armed groups in the country shall come under the
command and control of the Interim Authority,
and be reorganized according to the requirements
of the new Afghan security and armed forces.” 15
Afghans constantly identify disarmament, demobi-
lization and reintegration of armed groups as the
single greatest precondition for the establishment
of durable peace. But little has been achieved in the
disarmament process. In the provinces, command-
ers with little or no popular legitimacy remain the
principle military partners of the coalition forces,
and have used their power to consolidate control
over regional administrations and economies. Col-
laboration with local commanders has drawn the
coalition forces into their local factional and per-
sonal rivalries, compromising what is supposed to
be the forces’ non-partisanship in disputes unre-
lated to the war on terrorism.16
The United Nations has repeatedly postponed
the start of the demobilization program. In late
October 2003, the United Nations initiated the
Afghanistan New Beginnings Program, intended to
remove the support structure beneath senior com-
manders by disengaging lower-level commanders
and troops through individualized counseling,
vocational training, jobs creation and placement.
The New Beginnings Program requires combatants
from different political factions to give up their
weapons to the central government under the au-
thority of the Ministry of Defense. The program,
however, was negotiated in the absence of either an
international or a non-factional Afghan force that
can project its authority throughout the country.17
As a result, the Tajik commanders dominating the
Ministry of Defense have emerged as key players in
the demobilization process. Therefore there is a
serious risk that powerful figures will misuse the
program to strengthen patronage networks or to
demobilize their opponents. It is unlikely that an
armed group would trust its safety to a government
institution it views as representing factional rather
Afghans constantly identify disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of armed groups as the single greatest
precondition for the establishment of durable peace.
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than national interests. This leads to the conclusion
that there is urgent need to reform the Ministry of
Defense. Reform has an important economic pre-
requisite. The international community needs to
support demobilization by creating sustainable
employment opportunities for the demobilized
troops.
The Bonn Agreement requests the United Na-
tions to organize elections for June 2004, and to
ensure that they are free and fair. The elections are
seen not only as part of the democratic process, but
also as a conflict resolution mechanism to resolve
the question of who among various political parties
will govern Afghanistan. Conducting national
elections is a huge political undertaking. The June
2004 date allows for very little time to consider the
specific cultural issues that affect Afghan society,
and the political and security environment compli-
cates the process. At present, too many areas are
inaccessible for lack of security. Voter registration
must include the nomads and returning refugees.
In addition, a decision must be made about the
large numbers of refugees still in Pakistan and Iran.
There is also the problem of well-funded reli-
gious parties competing with the new,
poorly-funded democratic parties. The interna-
tional community must find a way to fund the
secular parties if they are to match the strength of
the religious parties that foreign governments with
religious agendas often fund. An important mea-
sure of the validity of an electoral process is the
extent to which the community where the election
is held accepts its legitimacy. Acceptance flows to a
large extent from the transparency with which the
process is pursued. Mechanisms for enhancing
transparency include providing an appropriate role
for the media, political parties, candidates, and
other elements of civil society, and implementing
an effective voter education program. The latter is
especially important in a country where the literacy
rate is low, respect for human rights is dismal, and
the electorate has not been exposed to regular elec-
tions.
In a post-conflict election, such as the proposed
June 2004 Afghanistan election, the electoral pro-
cess must address both security and violence
concerns, and the participation of marginalized
groups. The election process should be adminis-
tered in an environment free from violence,
intimidation and retribution. The state must take
all necessary steps to ensure that all adult citizens
qualify to vote, register, and exercise the right to
vote. Measures in Afghanistan need to be taken to
improve the security situation, and to ensure that
women are able to exercise their right to register
and to vote.
The human rights situation in Afghanistan
remains a matter of serious concern. Throughout
the country, the absence of the rule of law facili-
tates the abuse of power, most often by local
commanders and factional forces, and creates an
environment where illegal taxation, extortion,
forced displacement, kidnappings, rape, arbitrary
detention, and other human rights violations are
routine.18 The Afghan courts lack legitimacy, as
people perceive the judicial system as unable to
properly serve the interests of the people.19 In a
country where the rule of the gun has been the
dominant feature for well over two decades, the
justice sector has probably suffered more damage
than any other part of the state structure. Many of
the judges lack the necessary qualifications. The
courts—where they exist—are fragile and lack
basic facilities. In several provinces, warlords have
assumed judicial functions. In some other prov-
inces, Islamic clergy or local Shuras (councils of
elders) assume judicial functions. In many of these
provinces, trials which fall far short of internation-
ally accepted standards of fairness have reportedly
resulted in sentences such as stoning to death and
public lashings.20
Without adequately resourced and profession-
ally trained judicial and law enforcement
The author (center)
with Abdul Karimi,
Afghanistan’s minister
of justice (left), and
Jean Jacques Blais,
former minister of
defense from Canada
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institutions, victims have no legal recourse,  and
perpetrators act with impunity. The establishment
of the rule of law in Afghanistan is essential to the
peace process. Without the reform of institutions
of justice, the legal framework that underpins the
peaceful resolution of disputes will not take root.
Impunity for armed law-breakers will persist, and
citizens will be deprived of justice. Legitimate
economic activity is unprotected, and local and
international investors worry about entering the
market. In the context of Afghanistan’s fragile
transition to peace, judicial reform is inseparable
from security, and thus from commensurable re-
form of the military, police, and institutions of
correction.
Challenges to Implementing
the Bonn Agreement
Reestablishing the rule of law and an effective
government are essential prerequisites for democ-
racy and stability in Afghanistan. At the moment,
the Karzai government remains weak and com-
pletely dependent on donor support for its
financial resources. For example, in an effort to
exert greater authority over the provinces, President
Hamid Karzai summoned ten of the country’s
provincial governors and two regional commanders
to Kabul during May 2003, and demanded their
compliance with a 13-point decision of the Na-
tional Security Council. The decision banned
recruitment of private military
personnel, forbade unauthorized
military action, reaffirmed the
regulation that no individual can
hold both a military and a civil-
ian post, and dissolved
extra-governmental bodies and titles along with all
of their administrative and executive powers.
To date, the extent of compliance and the gov-
ernment’s capacity to enforce the decision remains
to be seen.21 One area of weakness undermining
the central government is its inability to collect
provincial revenues. Collection of provincial rev-
enues would enable the government to address
financial shortfalls, provide critically needed fi-
nances for central institutions, and gradually
increase the self-sufficiency and capacity of the
central government.
The other challenge facing Afghanistan is the
development of  constitutional arrangements to set
up viable institutions within which to conduct
governance. These institutions must foster an envi-
ronment where peace and development can
flourish, and ensure the promotion and protection
of human rights for all Afghans, irrespective of
gender, race or tribe. The constitution-making
process is being carried out under the auspices of a
Constitutional Commission with technical support
from UNAMA and the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP). Adopting a new Afghan
constitution raises debates on many issues: What
will be the place of Islam in the country? What
type of political system will be adopted? Will Af-
ghanistan be a federal or national State? The place
of Islam needs to be addressed and should not be
left vague. The role of Islam in Afghan society and
its relationship to the constitution will be the criti-
cal factor that determines the observance of human
rights in Afghanistan. Attempts to fudge the issue
are likely to be at the expense of the promotion
and protection of human rights—especially
women’s rights.
The legitimacy of the constitution which the
Constitutional Commission is developing is a criti-
cal matter. Questions raised about the process
relate to the openness of the process, a perception
that the religious leaders are dominating the pro-
cess, and a lack of civic education as to what the
process is about.22 Civic education can empower
citizens to curtail the role of the warlords. Consti-
tutional drafting experience suggests that not only
is the content of a constitution important, but also
The establishment of the rule of law in Afghanistan
is essential to the peace process.
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how, by whom, and in what historical context the
constitution is drafted and implemented. The new
constitution should steer Afghanistan into a func-
tioning and inclusive nationhood in which most
people feel they are citizens regardless of their
ethnicity or religion. It should be a liberating docu-
ment that empowers all Afghans and enables them
to participate in the economic development of the
country. Only then will the people of Afghanistan
collectively have a vested interest in normality and
in improving the conditions of society.
One factor that may prove to be an obstacle to
enduring peace in Afghanistan is the growing per-
ception of many ethnic Pashtuns that they lack
meaningful representation in the central govern-
ment, particularly in its security institutions.23
Although a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, heads the
Interim Administration, a Tajik armed faction
dominates the administration. For example, the
Tajiks control the Foreign Affairs Department, the
Defense Department, and the Department of the
Interior.
President Karzai is widely seen as unable to limit
either the power of the Tajiks within Kabul, or of
the commanders—irrespective of their ethnicity—
who wield power in other parts of the country.
Pashtun alienation is compounded by the displace-
ment of large numbers of Pashtuns in the North.
These Pashtuns, following the collapse of the
Taliban regime, became the targets of violent at-
tacks by factions of the United Front, a group that
helped the United States led coalition forces defeat
the Taliban. Risks posed by the growing disaffec-
tion among Pashtuns in Afghanistan should be
self-evident.
The Taliban came to power not only because of
the military assistance provided by Pakistan, but
also because local commanders had become notori-
ous for the abuse of civilians and the extortion of
money from traders. For the state to be effective, it
is necessary for those over whom it claims authority
to see it as legitimate and as deserving of their
respect and obedience. In the Afghan context, the
critical test for legitimacy is going to be whether or
not the country’s component ethnic
communities are equally repre-
sented in the main organs of state:
the courts, the legislature, the mili-
tary, and the executive.
The Peace Process
and Women’s Rights
Woman’s rights are a major concern
in Afghanistan. The lives of hun-
dreds of thousands of women and
children have been shattered in the
human rights catastrophe that has
devastated Afghanistan for the past
23 years.24 Armed groups have
massacred defenseless women in
their homes, or have brutally beaten and raped
them. Alongside these appalling abuses, women
have been prevented from exercising several of
their fundamental rights, including the rights of
association, freedom of expression and employ-
ment. The mujahedin groups perceive such
activities to be un-Islamic for women. Many parts
of the country have a strong emphasis on prosecut-
ing women and girls for adultery, for running
away from home, and for engaging in consensual
sex before marriage. In some parts of the country,
women are subjected to virginity tests, the failure
of which leads to a presumption of violating the
prohibition of sex outside of marriage. Women
still wear the heavily veiled burqa, which the
mullahs prescribe to follow the Qur’an’s injunc-
tion to dress moderately. Gross human rights
violations against women have been committed
with total impunity.
It is important to realize that while the viola-
tion of women’s rights in Afghanistan was worse
under the Taliban, it did not begin with them. It is
rooted in the deeply conservative traditions preva-
lent in Afghan society. For example, the Supreme
Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan was
reported in 1994 to have issued an Ordinance on
Women’s Veils, which ordained that women must
wear a veil that covers the whole body. The Ordi-
A woman, enveloped in
a burqa, with her child
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nance forbade women from leaving their homes or
from being looked at.
One of the most important challenges facing the
Afghanistan peace process is how to ensure the
participation of women in the political and eco-
nomic system, given the historical treatment of
women in the country. This will involve providing
women with alternative means of survival to obvi-
ate the need to rely on men to function in Afghan
society. This will also involve encouraging a more
liberal interpretation of Islam. In Afghanistan, as in
most Islamic countries, mullahs are highly re-
spected community leaders with great power over
social and political affairs. In Afghanistan, where
the majority of the population is illiterate, and
villages are isolated from the outside world,
mullahs are often the only source of information.
The real challenge in the coming months is
going to be registering women voters, especially in
the south and west, where conservative views about
taking pictures of women are still strong, and
women face danger if they decide to participate in
the political process.25 In order to make any mean-
ingful progress in the protection of women’s rights,
any future Afghan government needs to publicly
commit itself to women’s rights; to abolish all
legislation that treats women and men unequally,
or condones human rights violations; to recognize
that discrimination in law and practice against
women and girl children is a key contributory
factor to human rights abuses such as torture, in-
cluding rape and other forms of sexual violence;
and to initiate a plan of action against such dis-
crimination.
The Role of the International
Community in the Peace Process
The international effort should focus on building
effective governance institutions and providing the
necessary financial resources for this effort. With-
out a viable state apparatus, there can be no
development or observance of human rights. At
this stage of reconstruction in Afghanistan, it is
critical that development activities measurably
improve people’s lives and reinforce the central
government’s legitimacy.
Funds for commissions and the national elec-
tion mandated by the Bonn Agreement, as well as
for mine clearance, security reform, disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration, are budgetary
items that must be fully supported if the political
process is to move ahead. In particular, financial
assistance for training the police and a national
army are critical to establish security and to create a
solid foundation for a democratic state.
The domination of the Afghanistan political
landscape by armed groups and individual com-
manders is still the principal obstacle to the
implementation of the Bonn Agreement.26 Without
a credible process for disarming, demobilizing and
reintegrating former commanders and fighters into
society, it is inconceivable that Afghanistan can
meaningfully implement any of the key elements of
the peace process, including the adoption of a new
constitution, judicial reform, or elections.
In any democracy, a key indicator of effective
authority is the monopoly over security held by the
armed forces, and the elimination of armed militias
and private armies. This is sometimes achieved by
incorporating personnel from private armies into
the national militia. Warlords will change once the
rules of the game change. Alfonso Dhlakam, the
leader of the Mozambican rebel group RENAMO,
was known as one of the most brutal warlords in
the world. Once the civil war ended in 1993 and
successful disarmament was carried out, he became
a member of Parliament in Mozambique and has
since 1994 been playing parliamentary politics and
engaging in business. When resistance is no longer
feasible, most warlords will not fade away; they
will apply their skills and contacts to meet the
requirements of the new political system. The
phenomenon of warlords should be seen as a politi-
cal question intimately tied to security. Though
warlords have a military character, they are essen-
tially “politicians” attempting to perpetuate their
own political power in the existing political system.
Their resistance to disarmament is a political deci-
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sion. They intend to prevent the establishment of
an alternative political system, which they view as
displacing their own power.
The peace process in Afghanistan will be long,
and the international community must be prepared
for a long-term commitment. There can be no
quick fixes. The transition from authoritarianism
or conflict to democratic rule requires determined
long-term efforts. The enormity of the challenge
should not be underestimated. But concerted ef-
forts to overcome the obstacles could firmly place
Afghanistan on the road to democracy and devel-
opment. The war on terrorism is not going to be
won through armed conflict alone. It will be more
effectively won through economic development.
People need a stake in the world to defend its val-
ues. Also, the huge military expenditures necessary
for military operations can only be reduced by the
development of civil institutions that when effec-
tive, make military operations unnecessary and
redundant.
1. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghani-
stan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Gov-
ernment Institutions, 5 December 2001. (S/2001/1154).
2. Id.
3. Report of the Secretary-General, “The Situation in
Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace
and Security,” A/57/850-S/2003/754.
4. “Afghans Preserve Independence by All Costs” by
Daod, The Kabul Times, 20 August 2003.
5. “A Chronology of Key Events,” The Kabul Times, 20
August 2003.
6. Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) 15 October
1999; Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000) 14
December 2000.
7. Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) 20 Decem-
ber 2001.
8. Security Council Resolution, 1510 (2003) 14 Octo-
ber 2003. See also “Germany Pushes To Extend Security
Beyond Kabul,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 October
2003.
9. Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002) 28 March
2002.
10. “Afghanistan: The Problem of the Pushtun Alien-
ation,” Asia Report No. 62, 5 August 2003, Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG), Kabul/Brussels.
11. Afghanistan Monitor, Monitoring Afghanistan’s
Recovery, 15 August 2003 <www.afghanistanmonitor
.org>.
12. Christian Walker, “A Good First Year for the
Economy,” Afghanistan Monitor, Monitoring
Afghanistan’s Recovery, 1 August 2003 <www
.afghanistanmonitor.org>.
13. Muna Ndulo, “United Nations Observer Mission in
South Africa (UNOMSA): Security Council Resolu-
tions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) and the South African
Transition: Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-Keeping,”
African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 3, 1996,
205–238.
14. Afghanistan Report, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General Report, A/57/850-S2003/754, July
2003.
15. supra note 1.
16. “Afghanistan: The Problem of the Pushtun Alien-
ation,” supra note 10; “Disarmament and Reintegration
in Afghanistan,” Asia Report No. 65, 30 September
2003, International Crisis Group, Kabul/Brussels.
18. “Afghanistan: Re-establishing the Rule of Law,”
Amnesty International, 14 August 2003.
19. “Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional
Justice,” Asia Report, No. 45, 28 January 2003, Interna-
tional Crisis Group, Kabul/Brussels.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. “Afghanistan: Flawed Constitutional Process,” Asia
Report, No. 65, 12 June 2003, International Crisis
Group, Kabul/Brussels.
23. “Afghanistan: The Problem of the Pushtun Alien-
ation,” supra note 10.
24. “Women in Afghanistan: a Human Rights Catastro-
phe,” Amnesty International, London, 1995. A.I Index:
ASA 11/03/95; “Afghanistan: The International Com-
munity Must Act Immediately to Ensure Respect for
the Rule of Law,” A.I. Index: ASA 11/02/2003.
25. Press Briefing on the Occasion of the Official Sign-
ing of the Voter Registration Project, 14 August 2003,
UNAMA, Kabul (unpublished manuscript).
26. “Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan,”
International Crisis Group Report, 30 September 2003.
Muna B. Ndulo is a
professor of law at
Cornell Law School and
director of Cornell
University’s Institute for
African Development.
